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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

EARL CLARENCE BRADLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12701

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with the crime of grand
larceny. He was convicted in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, Honorable

Calvin Gould presiding. 'Ibis is an appeal from that
conviction.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with the
crime of grand larceny in violation of sections 76-38-1
and 76-:38-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953). Upon a plea of not

guilty a jury trial was had and a verdict rendered finding
the c.ppdlant guilty of grand larceny. The appellant
moved for a new trial alleging that the district court had
erred in denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of the evidence to support the charge of grand larceny.
The court denied the motion after a hearing.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the lower court's judgment, and appellant's conviction, affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is in general agreement with the facts
as stated by the appellant, except as stated hereafter:
The appellant was identified by one desk clerk
as the man who registered as "Earl Jones" at about 4:00
a.m. on the morning of June 2, 1970 (Tr. 6). The appel·
lant was also identified by a second desk clerk as the man
who registered in an adjoining room as "Jim Jones" at
about 10: 00 p.m., on the evening of ,June 2, 1970.
(1)

(2) The innkeeper testified that records were kept
of T. V. sets anytime one was removed from a room for
repair or other purpose (Tr. 22).
(3) The innkeeper testified that the rooms at the
Holiday Inn are cleaned every day by a maid, whether
the guests have moved out or not (Tr. 31). He also testified that the maids check the T. V. sets as they are clean·
ing to determine whether or not they are operative (Tr.
35).

1!

( 4) The innkeeper testified that T. V. sets were sold
occasionally for $25 to $50. And that such price was in
the nature of a special price to employees and charities
(Tr. 26).

The appellant admitted registering at the motel
using an assumed name, and leaving without paying for
the ioom (Tr. 83-87).
( 5)

ARGUMENT
fhc district court did not err in denying defendant's
DJ'.)bm to dismis:-; for insufficiency of evidence because:
( 1) the state did present evidence sufficient to take the
case to the jury, and (2) such evidence was sufficient
that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) If it
appearc; that the jury acting fairly and reasonably upon
the evidence could find the defendant guilty beyond a
doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed.

POINT I.
THE STATE PRESENTED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE CASE TO THE
1
-

URY.

In order to get its case before the jury it is only
necc::Jsary for the state to present some evidence of each
element of the crime charged. As stated in the case of
Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205
(1953):
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"In order to establish a prima facie case plain.
tiff must present some evidence of every element
needed to make out a cause of action." 252 P. 2<l
at 207.
The necessary elements to be proved in the case of
grand larceny are (1) the stealing, taking or carrying
away of (2) the personal property of another, (3) value<l
over $50.00 and ( 4) that such taking was felonious. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-38-1 and 76-38-4 ( 1953) .
The evidence introduced by the state which makes
out the prima facie case is as follows. The innkeeper
testified that the television sets in question were valued
at $50 each or $100 total (Tr. 19). The innkeeper also
testified that the television sets in question were missing
on the morning that the defendant left the motel room
(Tr. 18). It was also shown that the defendant rent.ed
the rooms where the television sets were kept by using
a false name (Tr. 6, 10). Such evidence was sufficient
to at least take the case to the jury for determination.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
WAS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT THAT REASONABLE MINDS ACTING FAIRLY UPON
IT COULD HA VE FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The jury can find not only facts directly proved by
the evidence, but any additional facts which are reason·
able inferences of the facts proved. State v. Kazda, 15
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Utah 2d :n3, 392 P. 2d 486 (1964).
It has also been held by this court that on review
the evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to

the verdict. In the case of State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d
292, 422 P. 2d 196 (1967), the defendant had been convicted of murder. This court said:

"It is our duty to respect the prerogative of
the jury as the exclusive judges of the credibility
of the witnesses and as the determiners of facts.
Consequently, we assume that they believed the
state's evidence, and we survey it, together with
all fair inferences that the jury could reasonably
draw therefrom, in the light most favorable to
their verdict." 422 P. 2d at 197.
Therefore, the evidence produced at trial, together
with reasonable inferences, will here be discussed in a
light favorable to the verdict of the jury. The state produced two room clerks who identified the defendant as
the man \Vho registered at the motel under the names of
Earl and Jim Jones (Tr. 6, 10). The defendant himself
admitted that he was the person who registered using
these assumed names (Tr. 73). The defendant also admitted that he did not check out of the motel and did
not pay the room rent due (Tr. 87). A reasonable inference from such testimony is that the defendant registered
with intent to defraud.
The innkeeper testified that records were kept which
would have shown if the T. V. sets had been removed
for repair or other purpose (Tr. 22). He also testified
that maids cleaned the rooms daily (Tr. 31) whether a
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guest had moved or not, and that the maids check the
T. V. sets to see that they are operative (Tr. 35). The
inference to be drawn from this testimony is that if the
'I'. V. sets had not been in the rooms prior to the defen.
dant's arrival, such fact would have been reported by one
of the maids. Also, since the defendant occupied the
rooms more than one day the maid would have reported
the sets missing while he was still there, if they had in
fact been missing. However, the T. V. sets were not re·
ported missing until the morning of the day that the de·
fenC:.ant left the rooms without paying. The inference is
that the defendant left with the T. V. sets. It is true
that no evidence was i..>itroduced to show that the defendant had possession of the T. V. sets after he left the
motel, but such evidence is not required. In the case of
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P. 2d 494 (1962),
the court said:
"Proof of larceny does not require a showing
that the accused be in possession of property
stolen . . . Such possession is merely evidence of
the taking, which is an essential element of
offense." 369 P. 2d at 494.
This position is further supported by the case of
State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P. 2d 228 (1943). In
th.'.Jt case t!1i0, court stated that:
" [t]he S'tate need not necessarily r2ly in larceny cases on the inference that may be drawn
from the proven fact that the defendant had possession of recently stolen property. A defendant
may be connected with a proven larceny. by :ircumstantial evidence even though the identical
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goods are never found in defendant's possession
or never found at all." 139 P. 2d at 231.
The innkeeper also testified that the T. V. sets in
quesi;on had a value of $50 each (Tr. 26).
Thus, it is clear that the jury could, from the evidence ;,1-ncl reasonable inferences, have found the defendant t;nilty bsyond a rem;onable doubt.

POINT III.
IF IT APPEARS THAT THE JURY ACTING
F/,lRLY AND REASONABLY COULD FIND
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE VERD IC T
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
For the defendant to prevail on an assertion of insufficiency of evidence:
" ... it must appear that, viewing the evidence
and all fair inferences reasonably to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, reasonable minds could not believe them
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but would necessary entertain some substantial doubt of their
guilt." State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.
2d 212 (1957).
Also it is settled that a jury verdict will not be reversed merely because reasonable minds may have had
a reasonable doubt or that conflicting inferences might
have been drawn from the evidence. A recent expression
of this court on the matter is contained in State v. Sullivan, supra. Here the court said:

8

"But it is not sufficient merely that reasonable minds may have entertained such doubt. Before a verdict may properly be set aside, it must
appeal that the evidence was so inconclusive or
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly
upon it must have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendants committed the crime." 302 P. 2d
at 212. (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Roberts, 01 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584 ( 1937),
this court stated:

"The fact that there was some contradictory
evidence or that conflicting inferences might reasonably be deduced from the evidence does not
warrant us in disturbing the verdict of the jury.''
63 P. 2d at 568. (Emphasis added.)
Finally, this court in another larceny case, State v.
Lamb, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942), said:

"It is not our province on appeal to judge the
credibility of witnesses when their testimony is in
direct conflict. We are concerned only with the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions by showing that the jury
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendants were guilty." 131 P. 2d at 809.
Thus it can be seen that the verdict of the jury will
be given great weight, and it will only be reversed if it is
shown that there is no evidence upon which it could reasonably be based.
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CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that there was
sufficient evidence whereby the issue was properly submitted to the jury, and that the jury acting fairly and
reasonably upon the evidence could have found, as it did,
that the appellant was guilty of the crime of grand larceny. The respondent further submits that this court
should not disturb those findings of fact and should
affirm the conviction of the appellant as adjudged in the
lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

